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The facts of [Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders] are outrageous.1 
– New York Times Editorial Board 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Just as the firm has long served as the foundational molecule of the U.S. capitalist 
economy,2 theories of the firm have for more than a century dominated legal and 
economic discourse.3 Ever since Ronald Coase published The Nature of the Firm in 1937 
and asked why firms should exist in an efficient market,4 classicists and neoclassicists 
have competed to develop theories—predominantly managerialist5 and contractual6—
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Chicago–Kent College of Law. I thank Alison LaCroix, Todd Henderson, Tamar 
Frankel, Jim Cox, Lyman Johnson, Don Langevoort, and Manning Warren, as well as the participants in 
roundtables on investment funds at Boston University School of Law and workshops at the University of Iowa 
College of Law and Chicago–Kent College of Law. I am also grateful to Robert Ennesser and Claire Willis for 
their research assistance. Portions of this Article are based on my blog postings and an amicus brief I wrote on 
behalf of law professors in support of the respondent in Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders. 
 1.  Editorial, So No One’s Responsible: If Mutual Funds Want to Lie, The Supreme Court’s 
Conservatives Have Given Them a Way to Do It, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at A26. 
 2. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1 (1986) (setting forth his postulate that the division of 
labor—and therefore the firm—serves as the central analytical unit in a market). 
 3.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 
499, 529–40 (2011) (explicating the development of theories of the firm in neoclassical and new institutional 
paradigms); see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives 
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1989) (noting the placement of theories of the firm in the corporate 
law discussion). 
 4.  R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937). 
 5.  Managerialist theories of the firm generally conceive of the firm as a hierarchical structure dominated 
by managerial power. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 62–65 (1976) 
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that best explain the structure and behavior of business organizations. Those theories, in 
turn, provide support to competing sides in the adjudication of important public policy 
decisions, such as the propriety of allowing corporations to make independent 
expenditures on behalf of political campaigns in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission.7 
The investment fund, by contrast, has languished at the margins of corporate theory, 
relegated as simply a minor, if somewhat curious, example of the firm. But as the flow of 
assets into funds has swollen dramatically in recent years,8 so too has the relevance of the 
question whether funds are, in fact, best considered a subspecies of the firm or instead 
ought to be evaluated as independent phenomena. Mutual funds now hold more than $12 
trillion in assets under management,9 a figure expected to rise considerably as private and 
public employers rapidly shed their pension plans.10 With corporate and governmental 
budgets buckling under the strain of promises to pay indefinite annuities and ever-
increasing health care premiums, one widespread solution has been to shift the 
responsibility of investing from employers to employees.11 Those individuals, in turn, 
primarily select funds as their vehicle of choice for investing for their future retirement, 
healthcare, and education.12 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the rise in the use of funds has brought with it a 
concomitant increase in fund-related litigation.13 After more than a quarter century of 
(tracing the breakdown in contractual consent to the breakdown of corporate controls); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., 
THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 32–39 (1954). 
6. Contractual theories of the firm generally conceive of the firm as a legal fiction that serves as a nexus
of contracts among discrete elements of production. See, e.g., Edward Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, 
Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 515 (2007) (explaining the emergence of 
theories of the firm); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (noting that the notion of legal fiction 
is not limited to firms); Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63 
AM. ECON. REV. 316, 320–24 (1973) (examining hierarchies that emerge from internal organization). 
7. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 881 (2010) (implicitly endorsing a 
contractual theory of the firm); id. at 947 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing instead 
for a concession theory of corporations). 
8. See INV. CO. INST., 2011 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 128 tbl.1 (51st ed. 2011) [hereinafter 
ICI FACT BOOK], available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2011_factbook.pdf (showing the massive increase in total 
net assets held by mutual funds over the past 70 years). 
9. See id. (listing total net assets of all U.S. mutual funds as $11.8 trillion as of 2010).
10. See, e.g., THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP: UNDERFUNDED STATE 
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND THE ROADS TO REFORM 1 (2010), available at http://downloads 
.pewcenteronthestates.org/The_Trillion_Dollar_Gap_final.pdf (describing the large number of states with 
struggling or failing pension plans). 
11. See id. at 10 (discussing various states’ efforts to implement risk sharing pension plans); see also 
James Dao, Does Debt Bill “Gut” Military? Depends Whom You Ask, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, http://atwar 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/does-debt-bill-gut-military-depends-whom-you-ask/ (discussing an “internal 
Pentagon panel” that “has proposed revamping military retirement benefits,” such as by converting the existing 
pension plan to a defined contribution plan). 
12. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 105 (referencing Figure 7.7, which illustrates the widespread use 
of mutual funds in the asset allocations of 401(k) plans). 
13. See generally John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee 
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale L.J. 84 (2011) (discussing the breadth of mutual fund 
litigation, particularly under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940). 
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declining to grant certiorari in any cases involving mutual funds,14 the Supreme Court 
has heard and ruled upon two notable fund disputes in the past two Terms. In the October 
2009 Term, the Court in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.15 reaffirmed—with minor 
alterations—a fiduciary standard for excessive fees under which no plaintiff has ever 
been able to prevail at trial.16 Then, in the October 2010 Term, the Court ruled in Janus 
Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders17 that a fund advisor is not liable for fraud in 
the prospectus of one of the advisor’s funds because the advisor is not the “maker” of 
those statements, notwithstanding the fact that the advisor forms and incubates the fund, 
furnishes all management to the fund, drafts and publishes the fund’s prospectuses, and 
perpetrates the fraudulent scheme.18 
In both these decisions, the ruling justices applied a neoclassical conception of the 
firm in their analysis of the business operations and legal issues of investment funds.19
Perhaps more surprising, however, was the justices’ admitted lack of comprehension and 
facility regarding funds, which was revealed at oral argument in Janus. Justice Stephen 
Breyer at one point said to an advocate, “No, you have to explain it to me more. I’m not 
being difficult. I understand this less well than you think I do, and I want to know.”20 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, inquiring about the structure of funds, asked what it means for 
them to be formed as entities distinct from advisors.21 Then, with oral argument almost 
concluded after an hour-long discussion, Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg inquired about recovery for shareholders in the fund itself,22 which seemed to 
surprise the oral advocate and much of the audience because the case concerned recovery 
only for shareholders in the fund’s advisor—an entirely different and unrelated group of 
investors. 
Though the justices may be proficient with the direct relationship between firms and 
their shareholders, that simple dyad is increasingly being exploded by the interposition of 
14. Previously, the most recent Supreme Court case involving a mutual fund was Daily Income Fund v. 
Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984). 
15. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1420 (2010).
16. For a discussion of this decision, see generally William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A 
Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61 (2010). 
17. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2297–98 (2011). For academic 
commentary on this ruling, see generally EDWARD PEKAREK & GENAVIEVE SHINGLE, THE MAKE BELIEVE OF 
JANUS—A BRIEF CASE COMMENT EXAMINING JANUS CAPITAL GROUP, INC. V. FIRST DERIVATIVE (N.Y. State Bar 
Ass’n Sec. Litig. & Arbitration) (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942748; Norman S. 
Poser, The Supreme Court’s Janus Capital Case (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 252, 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1946465. For a discussion of the Janus decision, see Michael S. 
Greve, Atlas Croaks. Supreme Court Shrugs, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 15, 27–29 (2011); Joseph A. Franco, Of 
Complicity and Compliance: A Rules-Based Anti-Complicity Strategy Under Federal Securities Law, 14 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 1, 53 (2011). 
18. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302–04. 
19. See id. at 2299 (“Although JCG created Janus Investment Fund, Janus Investment Fund is a separate 
legal entity owned entirely by mutual fund investors.”); Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1427 (identifying “scrutiny of 
investment advisor compensation by a fully informed mutual fund board” as the “cornerstone . . . of the effort to 
control conflicts of interest within mutual funds” (internal citations omitted)). 
20. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 
2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-
525.pdf. 
21. Id. at 24. 
22. Id. at 62–64. 
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financial intermediaries. Today, hedge funds, mutual funds, private equity funds, and 
similarly managed investment vehicles dominate the global economic playing field 
through their possession of both huge amounts of money and powerful systemic risk.23 In 
a recent analysis of the rise of intermediated financial investments, Professor Jill Fisch 
pointed out that institutional (primarily fund) investors now own “an unprecedented 
76.4% of the largest 1000 corporations.”24 And by many accounts, the U.S. economy 
suffered distress at the hands of systemic risk exacerbated by highly leveraged hedge 
funds during the 2008 financial crisis and then teetered towards greatest jeopardy in 
September of that year with the breaking of the buck in money market funds.25 
Yet funds sit uncomfortably within the neoclassical theoretical framework of 
business firms, which posits that any potential managerial power is counterbalanced by 
interlocking systems of market discipline. First, the robust set of mechanisms that 
discipline the behavior of firm managers—such as markets for corporate control, labor, 
and products—are notably absent or diminished in the context of investment funds.26
Second, unlike shareholders in firms, the shareholders of funds experience a rigidly 
intermediated relationship with their investments. Third, because of the wholesale shift 
from defined benefit pensions to defined contribution plans by both corporate and 
governmental employers, many fund shareholders have come to hold their investments 
involuntarily.27 
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s recent opinions concerning funds are overly 
formalistic, contradict the functional realities of investment funds, and rely upon 
unsatisfying theoretical paradigms. The question thus arises: what is the Supreme Court’s 
theory of the fund? Moreover, is that theory grounded in an accurate understanding of the 
nature and operation of investment funds? The answers to these questions, combined with 
normative critiques and counterarguments, might provide coherence to a growing body of 
jurisprudence that is sure to be tested further in the decades ahead. As more Americans 
come to use and to rely upon investment funds for their direct financial welfare now as 
well as their future retirement, more litigation and regulation is sure to follow. The 
23. See Rebecca Christie & Ian Katz, Hedge Funds May Pose Systemic Risk in Crisis, U.S. Report Says, 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 17, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-17/hedge-funds-may-pose-systemic-
risk-in-crisis-u-s-report-says.html (describing a confidential report by staff of the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, which identified the systemic risk posed by private equity firms, money market funds, and hedge 
funds). 
24. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1963 
(2010). 
25. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, MONEY MARKET FUND REFORM
OPTIONS 1 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/10.21%20PWG 
%20Report%20Final.pdf (identifying the inability of certain money market funds to repay their investors 100 
cents on each dollar invested, which triggered a run on such funds, as one of “several key events during the 
financial crisis” that “underscored the vulnerability of the financial system to systemic risk”). 
26. See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: 
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 
1031–32 (2005). 
27. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-118, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS: KEY
INFORMATION ON TARGET DATE FUNDS AS DEFAULT INVESTMENTS SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO PLAN SPONSORS 
AND PARTICIPANTS (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11118.pdf; see also THALER & 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 106–11 (2008) 
(discussing poor saving habits and automatic enrollments made without the explicit consent of shareholders). 
2012] The Supreme Court’s Theory of the Fund 775 
moment to test the soundness of this intellectual framework is before greater weight is 
balanced upon it. 
Part II of this Article discusses the shortcomings of the recent ruling in Janus 
Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, taking particular exception with the 
remarkable formalism of the majority’s reasoning, which appears to ignore or 
misapprehend the actual operations of mutual funds. If operating companies follow the 
lead of investment funds and use Janus as a model for immunity against securities 
litigation, deterrence of financial fraud is likely to drop substantially. Part III considers 
the potentially deleterious implications of the Court’s fund jurisprudence and predicts 
that substantial mischief will flow from the decision should its lessons be taken 
advantage of in other sectors of the economy. Part IV considers the theoretical lens—the 
theory of the fund—that justices of the Supreme Court appear to use to examine 
investment funds, and it identifies mistaken assumptions and problems with that lens and 
its use in the pair of recent rulings in Janus and Jones v. Harris. This Article considers 
whether alternative theories of the firm might inform a more useful theory of the fund for 
both the judicial and legislative branches in the future. 
II. FORMALISM & DAMAGE IN THE JANUS RULING
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Janus is, in the words of Professor Jeffrey Gordon, 
“one of those cases that takes your breath away.”28 In this 5–4 decision, Justice Clarence 
Thomas held that an investment advisor cannot be held liable for fraudulent statements in 
the prospectus of one of the advisor’s investment funds.29 Although the advisor formed, 
incubated, operated, and managed the fund, and drafted and filed the prospectus in 
question, the Court nevertheless ruled that the advisor did not “make” the fraudulent 
statement.30 Indeed, the Court was untroubled by the uncontested allegation that the 
advisor was wholly responsible for the fraud because it permitted market-timing arbitrage 
in its funds after filing a prospectus that explicitly banned that activity.31 Instead, the 
Court ruled that the maker of the statement is the fund itself, a distinct legal entity with 
“ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to 
communicate it.”32 
Nice legal formalities such as this are not new in the world of corporate law and 
their bright lines are often intended to sacrifice a modicum of equity for the comforts of 
predictability. But several problems exist with respect to the doctrinal reasoning itself in 
Janus. Perhaps more importantly, because formalities also tend to encourage highly 
strategic behavior, the implications of the Janus ruling threaten significant and broader 
damage in the future, both in the world of funds and the greater economy. 
28. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Only the Supreme Court Can “Make” a Tree, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (June 29, 2011), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/29/janus-capital-
group-v-first-derivative-traders-only-the-supreme-court-can-“make”-a-tree/. 
29. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299 (2011).
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 2300, 2306. 
32. Id. at 2302. 
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A. The Majority’s Reasoning in Janus 
The facts in Janus arose from allegations made by prosecutors in 2003 that several 
mutual fund complexes permitted market timing in their funds, in violation of express 
restrictions against such behavior published in those funds’ public securities filings.33 As 
a general concept, market timing is simply the practice of attempting to execute 
investment decisions to benefit from positive market developments or to avoid 
deleterious ones—certainly a very widespread phenomenon in the investment world and 
not at all legally suspect.34 But in this particular context, the term has a more precise and 
somewhat more pernicious valence.35  
An investment advisor orchestrates a market-timing ruse first by attracting 
individual, long-term, buy-and-hold investors to its funds with the promise of safety—
that is, an explicit policy barring market timing.36 The market timers are sophisticated 
institutional traders, such as hedge-fund traders, who move large sums of money rapidly 
in and out of mutual funds to arbitrage the unusual pricing system of those funds.37 The 
fact that mutual funds are priced only once a day rather than continuously creates this 
opportunity for exploiting economic developments occurring around the world. Again, 
the practice is not illegal, but rapid trades in and out of a mutual fund can dilute the 
returns of long-term investors and drive up transaction costs for the entire fund. For that 
reason, many advisors of mutual funds voluntarily impose their own bans on market 
timing.38 Janus Capital Management, as advisor to the Janus funds, promulgated and 
published such a ban in the prospectus to the Janus funds. The plaintiffs in the Janus 
litigation contended that Janus subsequently entered into profitable, undisclosed 
arrangements with certain hedge funds to permit market timing.39 Throughout the 
entirety of these dealings, the investment advisor collected fees from both the winners 
and losers of the market timing.40 This allegation of fraud was at the root of the dispute 
in Janus.41 
An illustrative case of market timing involves time-zone arbitrage.42 Because 
mutual fund shares are priced only once a day, usually just after the primary stock 
markets close at 4:00 p.m. Eastern, the accuracy of those prices quickly deteriorates. 
Subsequent events on the other side of the world may move the price of securities of 
33. Id. at 2300. 
34. See generally Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds: 
Market Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235 (2006) (examining the intricacies of market timing 
practices). 
35. See id. at 236 (defining market timing).
36. See id. 
37. See William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual 
Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1453 (2006) (discussing market timing and providing an example of it). 
38. See id. at 1453 (noting incentives for advisors to impose their own ban on market timing).
39. See Consolidated Amended Fund Derivative Complaint at 14–16, In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig. et al., 
No. 04-md-15863 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2004), 2004 WL 2630907. 
40. See id. 
41. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011) (explaining 
allegations of misrepresentation). 
42. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 662–65 (2010) (outlining the problems time-zone arbitrage 
raises). 
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foreign companies. Thus, the actual net asset value of any U.S. mutual fund holding those 
foreign securities in its portfolio will fluctuate even before the fund’s shares are re-priced 
the next day. During those periods when a fund’s price and its value no longer 
correspond, a sophisticated market timer can arbitrage the difference by moving large 
sums of cash into (to realize gains) or out of (to avoid losses) the fund. Of course, the 
market timer’s gains are necessarily other investors’ losses: 
By moving large blocks of cash into a fund in anticipation of a rise in the 
fund’s value, the market timer dilutes the worth of each individual share of the 
fund. Although the timer’s new cash was not invested in the underlying 
securities whose value has risen, the investment has increased the number of 
fund shares outstanding. Thus, with a greater denominator, the [Net Asset 
Value] pricing equation results in profits from positive market movements 
being shared by a greater number of shareholders.43  
In addition to dilution, market timing generates material transaction costs for a fund and 
thus for each of the fund’s shareholders. The quick inflow and outflow of large sums of 
money creates inefficiencies in the management of the fund as portfolio managers must 
accommodate large redemptions by either maintaining greater liquidity cushions (which 
are likely to impose drag upon fund returns) or by executing unanticipated trades to 
liquidate portfolio holdings (which increase fund fees).44 
Investment managers are, of course, well aware of these costs and, accordingly, 
demand compensation from the market timers.  
In exchange for the ability to move $25 million rapidly in and out of a 
particular fund, for instance, a market timer might offer to leave untouched $50 
million of “sticky” assets in a different fund in the advisor’s complex. Such an 
arrangement, of course, pits the interests of the shareholders of the timed fund 
against those of the shareholders in the fund with sticky assets.45 
If we assume that an allegation of market-timing fraud is true, then the investment 
advisor has masterminded an intricate deception against two different groups of investors 
simultaneously: the long-term purchasers of shares in the advisor’s mutual funds who are 
vulnerable to market timing, as well as the holders of equity in the advisor itself. This 
second population of investors defrauded by the scheme—which would include the 
plaintiffs in Janus—comprises the advisor’s equity holders who invest in the advisor in 
reliance upon public assurances that the advisor disallows market timing in the funds that 
it manages and from whom the advisor generates its primary profits. When allegations of 
advisors’ complicity in market timing came to light in 2003, those investors suffered the 
greatest collapse in their investments as stock prices in advisors such as Janus plummeted 
by more than 20% in just a few weeks.46 
43. Birdthistle, supra note 37, at 1455. 
44. See id. at 1455–56 (outlining these steps managers must take).
45. Id. at 1456.
46. See, e.g., Riva D. Atlas, Marketplace; Janus Capital Meets the Enemy and It Is Janus, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2003, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/13/business/market-place-janus-capital-
meets-the-enemy-and-it-is-janus.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (noting that Janus Capital lost “more than 20 
percent of the market value of its shares in recent weeks”). 
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For certain theoretical objections, the precise nature of the underlying fraud alleged 
might be of little relevance to the Court’s analysis in Janus, but the far-reaching 
mechanics of market timing reveal the central role that investment advisors play in both 
operating mutual funds and engineering this particular violation of section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). To accommodate institutional market 
timers, an investment advisor needs—and indeed arrogates for itself—control over all 
aspects of mutual fund operations: the advisor advertises its funds to new purchasers 
through an affiliated distributor (which is the fund equivalent of an underwriter); the 
advisor determines the policies that govern those funds and publicizes them in fund 
prospectuses that its attorneys write and publicly file; the advisor monitors trading 
activity in the shares of its funds through an affiliated transfer agent or administrator 
responsible for back-office infrastructure; and the advisor negotiates special 
arrangements for favored clients such as hedge funds who engage in the actual market 
timing.47 In sum, to engineer a practice of market timing, an investment advisor must 
coordinate all major aspects and operations of a mutual fund.  
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 prohibits “mak[ing] any untrue 
statement of material fact” in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.48 The 
petitioners in Janus sought a novel exception from liability under section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act for investment managers who manipulate or deceive their shareholders.49
So long as those advisors conduct their activities through a distinct business trust, 
petitioners contended, such defendants ought to be impervious to lawsuits brought by 
shareholders. To succeed upon this theory—and thereby to immunize fund advisors—the 
Janus petitioners had to persuade the Supreme Court to accept two dubious contentions: 
(1) lifeless funds created and controlled by advisors enjoy meaningful independent 
existence; and (2) advisors are simply minions of those funds. In each case, the opposite 
is far closer to the truth. But, in Janus, the Court did indeed adopt those two arguments as 
premises for its ruling.50 
Janus argued—and the Court agreed—that investment advisors should not be liable 
for any such violations of section 10(b).51 One of the most troubling and perverse 
consequences of this ruling is that the investors can now never recover, even though no 
one disputes that they were defrauded. Janus persuaded the district court at trial that the 
plaintiffs cannot recover from the funds, because those entities are empty shells with “no 
assets separate and apart from those they hold for shareholders”;52 nor can they recover 
from the advisors, as Janus asserted successfully before the Supreme Court,53 because 
any false and misleading statements were made solely by the funds, which Janus insisted 
are autonomous entities. 
47. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS: MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISERS §§ 12, 21–22, 27, 32 (2d ed. 2001). 
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
49. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, No. 09-525 (4th 
Cir. Oct. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 3614467. 
50. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304–05 (2011). 
51. Id. at 2299.
52. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 853 n.3 (D. Md. 2005).
53. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) 
(No. 09-525), 2010 WL 3501188. 
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The scope of this heads-I-win-tails-you-lose theory may, in the immediate aftermath 
of Janus, apply only to the unique structure of mutual funds, but the Court’s endorsement 
may well furnish a blueprint for more widespread impunity from securities violations.54 
A corporation that publicly claims to police the quality of its products while soliciting 
douceurs that jeopardize that quality—as may occur with market timing, tainted 
medication, or faulty tires—has received a tutorial on how to evade legal liability. 
Following the Janus example, such corporations would need only to replicate the 
structure of mutual funds by forming “another,”55 “different,”56 and judgment-proof 
entity to furnish—via contract rather than internal employment—all management 
functions externally.57 Indeed, dozens of defendants in federal cases have already 
invoked Janus to immunize their alleged wrongdoings, and the courts have largely been 
receptive.58 
The Supreme Court could have avoided such a result while also maintaining 
doctrinal consistency, by instead applying the principles of duty and proximity set forth 
in prominent and recent decisions such as Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific–Atlanta, Inc.59 The vital holding of Stoneridge was that liability turns on 
concrete connections between the defendants, the plaintiffs, and the fraud—such as those 
between investment advisors, their shareholders, and market timing—not upon stage-
managed formalisms.60 The justices therefore have a more finely tuned and arguably 
more sophisticated analytical instrument in their toolbox than the categorical formalism 
of the majority’s opinion in Janus would suggest. 
1. Control
The federal judicial, legislative, and executive branches have each recognized that 
managers exert an extraordinary degree of control over their funds. This dominance 
54. Senator Patrick Leahy characterized the decision as giving corporations a “license to lie” and a 
“roadmap for fraud.” See, e.g., Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis? Progressives’ Quest to Reclaim the Constitution 
and the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1217 (2011) (citing Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How 
the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing on Corporate Behavior] (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)). 
55. Hearing on Corporate Behavior, supra note 54, at 8. 
56. Id. at 9. 
57. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Taub, Will Bad Funds Make Good Law?: Janus v. First Derivative Traders Part 
VIII, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Jan. 15, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-
issues/will-bad-funds-make-good-law-janus-v-first-derivative-trader-7.html (speculating about possible 
collateral effects of such a ruling beyond the world of investment funds). 
58. See, e.g., Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 694 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The
insufficiency of [plaintiff’s] pleadings are reinforced by the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Janus . . . which 
sets the pleading bar even higher in private securities fraud actions seeking to hold defendants primarily liable 
for the misstatements of others.”); In re Coinstar Inc. Sec. Litig., 2011 WL 4712206, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 
6, 2011) (“While the Supreme Court in Janus considered whether a business entity could be held liable for a 
prospectus issued by a separate entity, its analysis applies equally to whether Kaplan, Rench, and Smith may be 
held liable for the misstatements of their co-defendants.”).  
59. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152 (2008) (explaining 
that in order to be liable under section 10(b) there must have been a duty to disclose, and if this duty is 
breached, the plaintiff-investor must show a detrimental reliance).  
60. Id. 
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stands in marked contrast to the arm’s-length relationship of business arrangements in 
other segments of the economy and, of course, to the characterization by Janus in this 
case of managers as merely distant and subservient third parties. 
The Supreme Court addressed the topic of mutual funds just one year before Janus 
in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.,61 when it noted that it is “typical” for a fund manager 
to “create[] the mutual fund,” “select[] the fund’s directors, manage[] the fund’s 
investments, and provide[] other services.” In its previous rulings concerning mutual 
funds, the Court also remarked on the unusual proximity of managers to their funds.62
Also, in perhaps the most well-known federal decision on mutual funds, the Second 
Circuit noted that Congress “recognized . . . the potentially incestuous relationships 
between many advisors and their funds.”63 
The congressional recognition to which the Second Circuit referred exists in a 
United States Senate Report accompanying the passage of the Investment Company 
Amendments Act of 1970.64 The report noted “the unique structure of this industry” in 
which funds are typically “formed, sold, and managed by external organizations, that are 
separately owned and operated”; that managers “select the funds’ investments and 
operate their businesses,” and provide “almost all management services”; and therefore, 
“a mutual fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the advisor.”65 
In the executive branch, the Securities and Exchange Commission has on several 
occasions reiterated the domination of funds by their advisors. For instance, the SEC 
stated that “the term ‘investment advisor’ is to some extent a misnomer” because “[t]he 
so-called ‘advisor’ is no mere consultant. He is the fund’s manager. Hence the investment 
advisor almost always controls the fund.”66 
Indeed, even the advisors’ own trade association, the Investment Company Institute, 
has in Supreme Court pleadings acknowledged the extensive degree to which managers 
run their funds, prepare fund prospectuses, and incur consequent liability: “Mutual fund 
advisors . . . prepare prospectuses, shareholder reports and other disclosures for which 
they have liability under the securities laws.”67 The advisor in the Janus litigation 
nevertheless insisted that investment advisors are, as a categorical matter, only 
“secondary actors” and that any of their alleged malfeasance was therefore too attenuated 
to trigger legal liability.68 Having begged the central question of the dispute in this case 
by labeling themselves taxonomically too remote to be held liable, Janus then concluded 
at each step in their fraud-on-the-market analysis that they were in fact too remote to be 
held liable. 
Yet, as evidence of their self-asserted inviolable status, Janus proffered an array of 
61. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010). 
62. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984) (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 
481 (1979)) (noting that mutual funds are “typically created and managed by a pre-existing external 
organization known as an investment advisor”). 
63. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 929–30 (1982). 
64. See generally S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897.
65. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928; S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 4 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 
4901. 
66. In re Steadman Sec. Corp., 46 S.E.C. 896, 920 n.81 (1977) (citations omitted).
67. See Brief for The Investment Co. Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18, Jones v. Harris 
Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (No. 08-586). 
68. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 53, at 15–21. 
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formalities, which the Court ultimately and surprisingly chose to adopt. Central to this 
argument is the contention that investment managers are merely subaltern “service 
providers” orbiting funds at great distance, tethered only by the flimsiest thread of 
contract. Very much to the contrary, investment managers are prime movers who reign 
from the center of the mutual fund universe. In the beginning, managers create, incubate, 
and hold their funds as wholly owned subsidiaries.69 During this genesis, when the 
advisor is the sole shareholder and investor in a fund, the advisor and the fund enter into 
the advisory agreement—which the Court relied upon as evidence of independence—
whose two signatories are both under the control of a single entity: the advisor.70 
2. To “Make” a Statement
One of the more interesting aspects of the majority and dissenting opinions in Janus 
was their dispute over the definition of “to make,”71 which was central to their 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5’s prohibition against the making of any material 
misstatement or omission.
72
 Indeed, one wit compared the Court to the Council of Nicaea 
and the arguments to the Arian controversy in fourth century Christianity.
73
 
The Fourth Circuit, whose decision was appealed to the Supreme Court in this case, 
concluded that Janus made the alleged misstatements and that plaintiff–shareholders 
relied to their detriment upon those statements because of the dominant role of 
investment managers.74 In both Stoneridge and Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,75 the Supreme Court chose not to confine section 10(b) 
liability to the entity to which a public misrepresentation is expressly attributed.76 To 
issue such a categorical rule would have been to invite game playing in categorization, 
the majority reasoned, whereby perpetrators could escape liability merely by interposing 
separate but subservient entities between themselves and their fraud.77 The facts of Janus 
turned out to be an illustration of the very circumstances understood but unruled upon in 
Stoneridge, in which one entity could so dominate another that it ought to be recognized 
to have made the relevant misrepresentations and therefore to be held liable as a primary 
violator.78 
The industry practice in mutual funds supports the contention that the fund advisor 
“wrote and represented its policy against market timers”;79 that it “publicly issu[ed] false 
69. See Birdthistle, supra note 37, at 1423–24 (noting that managers sustain funds on “life support” by 
externally providing all fund management). 
70. See generally FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 47, § 12. 
71. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302, 2306 (2011). 
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
73. See Keith Paul Bishop, A Modern Council of Nicaea—Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in Janus 
Today, CALIFORNIA CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW BLOG (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.calcorporatelaw.com/ 
2010/12/a-modern-council-of-nicaea-supreme-court-hears-oral-arguments-in-janus-today. 
74. See In re Mut. Funds. Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 122, 127 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing the Stoneridge and
Central Bank cases in support of its holding). 
75. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 165 (1994); 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific–Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 156 (2008). 
76. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166–67. 
77. See id. 
78. Id. at 162. 
79. Joint Appendix at *72a, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) 
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and misleading statements” concerning that policy;80 and that petitioners “caused mutual 
fund prospectuses to be issued for Janus mutual funds and made them available to the 
investing public, which created the misleading impression that [petitioners] would 
implement measures to curb market timing in the Janus Funds.”81 Based upon this 
analysis, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “[t]hese statements, taken together, allege that 
[Janus], by participating in the writing and dissemination of the prospectuses, made the 
misleading statements contained in the documents.”82 
Indeed, investment managers of mutual funds satisfy each of the Stoneridge criteria 
that mere aiders and abettors or other secondary actors cannot.83 First, investment 
managers clearly owe a duty to disclose their true management policies to their own 
shareholders, whereas Scientific–Atlanta and Motorola owed nothing of the kind to the 
plaintiff–shareholders of Charter Communications.84 Second, managers play a central 
role in preparing and disseminating public disclosures for their funds, whereas the 
defendants in Stoneridge had no involvement with Charter’s financial statements.85 
Third, fraud of the sort alleged in this case centers upon “the realm of financing 
business,” and thereby triggers the strictures of section 10(b) for any perpetrators, unlike 
the dealings in Stoneridge, which occurred only within the “realm of ordinary business 
operations.”86 
The trial record amply demonstrated that Janus effectively merged the existence of 
the funds into their own: regarding control of “business affairs,”87 officers (all seventeen 
officers of the Janus funds were Janus Capital Management Vice Presidents),88 office 
space (provided by Janus Capital Management),89 business address (shared by the funds, 
Janus Capital Management, and Janus Capital Group),90 and even signature (the 
prospectuses were signed simply by “Janus”).91 
With the Supreme Court concluding that the investment advisor does not make the 
statements, misleading or otherwise, published in a fund prospectus, one is left to wonder 
who does. To answer that the fund makes such statements is to admit circuitously that the 
advisor does so, inasmuch as the fund has no employees and its only officers are 
(No. 90-525), 2010 WL 3501716. 
80. Id. at *111a. 
81. Id. at *63a. 
82. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 180 L. Ed. 2d 
166 (2011) (emphasis in the original). 
83. For a discussion of secondary liability in the context of this ruling, see Shuenn (Patrick) Ho, A Missed 
Opportunity for “Wall Street Reform”: Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud After the Dodd–Frank Act, 49 
HARV. J. LEG. 175, 183–86 (2012) (discussing secondary liability). See generally Elizabeth Cosenza, Is the 
Third Time a Charm? Janus and the Proper Balance Between Primary and Secondary Actor Liability Under 
Section 10(b), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019 (2012) (discussing finding the balance between primary and 
secondary actor liability).  
84. Stoneridge Inv. Partners. v. Scientific–Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 158–59 (2008).
85. Id. at 160–61.
86. Id. at 161. 
87. Appendix at *143a, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) 
(No. 09-525), 2010 WL 3501716. 
88. Id. at *23a–24a. 
89. Id. at *143a. 
90. Id. at *165a. 
91. Id. at *42a. 
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employees of the manager, who pays their salaries. To answer instead that the Janus 
fund’s board of trustees makes such statements is to misunderstand fundamentally the 
process by which hundreds of pages of mandatory disclosure are created for each fund 
every year, a production from which trustees are almost entirely absent. In fact, the 
detailed and extensive content of fund disclosure is furnished almost exclusively by the 
only entity who knows that information: the investment advisor actually operating the 
fund.92 For all the inquiry into circumstances and definitions, Janus itself answered the 
central question in this case: Janus Capital Management admitted in an interrogatory 
asking who drafted the prospectuses that it was its own in-house attorneys, “Kelley 
Howes, Bonnie Howe, and other members of JCM’s legal department,” who drafted the 
prospectuses.93 
In a particularly inapt analogy, the Court adopted the petitioners’ argument that the 
giver of a speech, not the speechwriters, “makes” a speech.94 No one familiar with the 
operation of this industry would ever confuse a mutual fund for the giver of a speech. In 
such a comparison, funds are far more akin to the microphone and speakers: necessary 
instrumentalities that insentiently broadcast the principal’s message. The investment 
manager, of course, is always the principal, writing and broadcasting the communications 
of its funds. And courts have long since ceased to find inanimate objects guilty for the 
wrongdoings of those who wield them.95 
3. Attribution
Although the Court did not reach the issue of reliance expressly, the 10b-5 doctrine 
in this area illustrates further the discord and disruption of the Janus ruling. Whereas 
Janus argued that putative plaintiffs cannot demonstrate reliance upon any misleading 
statements in a prospectus unless the prospectus “directly attributed” those statements to 
the manager,96 such a strict attribution rule would accord with neither the rationale of the 
fraud-on-the-market theory itself nor the Court’s rulings in Stoneridge and Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson.97 Indeed, such a rule would automatically eliminate the possibility of review 
for a vast universe of fraud and, in so doing, render the Stoneridge inquiry into 
remoteness and attenuation largely irrelevant. Without direct attribution, the courts would 
dispose of cases prior to any Stoneridge analysis, whereas with direct attribution, 
Stoneridge would almost necessarily be satisfied.98 
Consider the numerous cases in which a corporate executive, for instance, 
intentionally misleads a journalist or financial analyst, who in turn publishes highly 
92. For a discussion of the definition of “make” in this case, see James D. Redwood, To Make or to Mar: 
The Supreme Court Turns Away Another Securities Law Plaintiff, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 463, 463–65 (2012). 
93. Appendix, supra note 87, at *507a. 
94. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
95. See Calero–Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) (“Deodands did not 
become part of the common-law tradition of this country.”). 
96. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 53, at 11–12.
97. See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (displaying a standard contrary to strict 
attribution). 
98. See Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and 
Third-Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2157–61 (2010). 
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favorable reports without identifying the executive as a source.99 Even in the absence of 
direct attribution, the executive has nevertheless perpetrated a clear fraud on the market. 
Courts have reasonably responded to such cases by finding the executive liable, yet 
petitioners’ rule would overturn such decisions.100 A strict attribution rule would 
senselessly abort the sound analysis of Stoneridge and needlessly replace realism with 
formalism. A better approach, and one more consistent with the Court’s approach in 
Stoneridge, would instead inquire whether the executive engaged in a deceptive scheme 
and, if so, whether that deception was sufficiently proximate to the statements upon 
which investors relied.101 
On the Janus facts, however, any notion of public attribution is readily satisfied. 
Investment advisors themselves strive consciously to form a public connection between 
themselves and their funds. When forming a new fund, the advisor typically selects a 
name that blazons the advisor’s brand upon the new fund by incorporating the advisor’s 
own name into the fund’s name. Hence, each of the putatively autonomous funds at issue 
in this dispute featured “Janus” in its name. Investment advisors take direct and voluntary 
measures to persuade the marketplace to attribute the performance of their funds to the 
operations of their managers. 
The marketplace, in turn, reasonably does so. Sophisticated investors familiar with 
the structure and operation of mutual funds know that statements published by a mutual 
fund flow from the will of its advisor. Less sophisticated investors unaware of any 
separation between advisors and their funds are likely to assume that mutual fund shares 
are simply products purchased directly from the manager. In both cases, the acts of funds 
are widely attributed to their advisors. One wonders to whom else they could 
meaningfully be attributed. Indeed, were an investment advisor to make an exculpatory 
statement in a fund prospectus (rather than the incriminating one at issue in Janus), one 
would fully expect the manager to argue that such statements sufficiently placed the 
manager’s own investors on salutary notice. Indeed, as an empirical matter, the 
marketplace demonstrated its widespread attribution of fund statements to investment 
managers: upon the public allegation of market timing in mutual funds, stock prices of 
the accused advisors fell rapidly, including more than 20% in Janus itself.102 
Had the Court endorsed Janus’s effort to substitute “express” for actual attribution in 
this analysis, then a critical element of proving section 10(b) liability would have fallen 
within the direct manipulation of perpetrators. As the government noted in its arguments 
to the Court in Janus, to avoid liability, a violator would need only be discreet enough to 
avoid speaking aloud what the marketplace already knows.103 When the Court next 
evaluates its 10b-5 doctrine, it should refrain from creating a unique exemption from 
99. See id. at 2159 (identifying indirect methods of attribution that would avoid the strict attribution 
standard). 
 100.  See id. (citing Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997); Freeland v. Iridium World 
Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 74–76 (D.D.C. 2008)) (showing how executives can avoid liability under 
strict attribution). 
101.  See Langevoort, supra note 98 (elaborating on how such an approach would operate). 
 102.  See, e.g., Atlas, supra note 46 (stating that Janus Capital lost over 20% of its value in a matter of 
weeks in 2003). 
103. Brief for Respondent at 16, Janus Capital Grp., Inc., v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4253501. 
 2012] The Supreme Court’s Theory of the Fund 785 
section 10(b) liability for investment managers or any future violators who are likely to 
follow their example. Certainly, there are reasons for Congress and courts to be careful in 
fashioning the scope of liability in securities class actions under section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act. Frank Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel, and many other commentators have 
examined the problems of potential remedial overbreadth if shareholders are too readily 
compensated in a system where securities fraud produces little, if any, net harm to 
diversified investors.104 
Yet even if accurate compensation did not entirely justify many securities class 
action suits, effective deterrence does, and deterrence would be welcome in the mutual 
fund advisory industry because of its recent track record. The past decade has seen 
numerous revelations of fraud and other misconduct across many aspects of the mutual 
fund advisory business beyond just market timing, such as late trading, unfair valuation, 
and soft-dollar practices.105 When Congress limited the expansion of lawsuits with the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress did not choose—then or 
since—to eliminate section 10(b) liability altogether. The liability that remains applies 
squarely to the investment advisors of mutual funds that perpetrate market-timing frauds. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT’S RULING IN JANUS
The Supreme Court’s hostility to the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-
5 is well known, and its last three rulings in this field—Central Bank, Stoneridge, and 
now Janus—each attempt to restrict that right without explicitly eliminating it and 
thereby overruling the weighty precedent of Basic.106 Nevertheless, the Janus ruling does 
more than merely narrow the scope of the right—it damages the very structure of private 
deterrence of wrongdoing in the financial markets. 
First, the decision appears to strain itself to find a way to immunize clear 
perpetrators from accountability. One of the most troubling aspects of the Janus ruling is 
that, even if one is willing to grant credence to the notion that the fund is endowed with 
certain independence through its board of trustees, only the investment advisor is in a 
position to run the business in accordance with—or in violation of—its prospectus. On 
the facts of Janus, Janus drafted a prospectus that permitted no market timing, and then 
Janus agreed to permit market timing.107 Even if the board of trustees had furnished 
oversight, which is a dubious proposition in an industry with famously weak board 
 104.  See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 611, 638–41 (1985) (considering aftermarket effects and potential remedies in securities cases); cf. Paul G. 
Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 628–29 (1992) 
(noting that Easterbrook and Fischel do not address the deterrent effect of social cost, such as where issuers are 
forced to pay damages that are less than their net gains). 
 105.  See, e.g., Josh Friedman, FleetBoston, B of A to Pay $675 Million, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at C1; 
Tom Lauricella, Alliance Offers Annual-Fee Cut as Part of Proposed Settlement, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2003, at 
C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10710996418574900.html. 
 106.  Professor James Cox invokes this trilogy of cases as authority for the “truism” that “corporations pay 
and individual wrongdoers get a pass.” James D. Cox, Securities Class Actions as Public Law, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 73, 83 n.35 (2011), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2011/Cox.pdf 
(responding to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011)). 
107.  Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2300 (2011). 
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monitoring, nobody connected with the litigation made—or could seriously make—an 
argument that the board provided any managerial functions to the funds. The ruling thus 
turns a blind eye to “agency capitalism”108—that is, the willingness of agents and 
intermediaries to satisfy their own interests at the expense of their principals—at a time 
when ever more investors are coming to rely upon these intermediaries for their financial 
well-being. Indeed, in the diverse array of things that went wrong during the recent 
financial crisis, one disturbing commonality in the poor performance of hedge funds, 
ratings agencies, money market funds, and beyond was precisely this willingness of 
gatekeepers to abdicate their duties to fiduciaries and others in favor of advancing their 
own immediate pecuniary interests. Surely, in the wake of such financial peril, the 
Supreme Court ought not provide immunity for such behavior. 
Second, the formalistic nature of the ruling—both in its narrow-minded line drawing 
and its willful disregard of the functional realities of investments funds—would appear to 
encourage opportunistic game playing in the future. Surely, business firms will look at 
this decision, note well the very favorable immunity that investment funds have just won 
from the highest court in the land, and explore precisely how they might restructure their 
own affairs to enjoy the same effects.109 If Exxon Corporation, for example, created an 
external management firm, shifted all current Exxon assets to a newly formed shell 
company, and then provided all executive management of the business via contract 
between those two entities, then could it not also limit its exposure to securities suits by 
citing Janus? If so, then the ruling would be an effective overruling of Basic and a 
judicial invalidation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. Indeed, in just the 
first handful of weeks and months following the Janus ruling, the lower federal courts 
have already featured executives accused of malfeasance attempting to raise a “Janus” 
defense pursuant to which they plead that it was their corporations, not themselves, who 
made the allegedly fraudulent statements in dispute.110 
Third, the ruling is not likely to bring with it the boon of clarity that is often the 
consoling virtue of highly formalistic, if somewhat inequitable, rulings. As Donald 
Langevoort has noted, several situations already exist in which courts find parties who do 
not have “ultimate authority” guilty for their wrongdoings: if an accountant admits to 
having provided false financial statements for a corporation, for instance, or an executive 
plants a false story about a corporation’s prospects to a news reporter, almost all courts 
have found—and are likely to continue to find—such a defendant guilty of a Rule 10b-5 
violation.111  
 108.  See Gordon, supra note 28 (stating that the Janus decision “exacerbates the problem of ‘agency 
capitalism’”). 
 109.  Interestingly, this ruling may not be easy to characterize as merely a “pro-business” ruling by the 
Roberts court. Donald Langevoort has pointed out that other securities cases in the same term did not result in 
pro-business rulings. See Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities 
Jurisprudence 1 (Georgetown Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 12-019, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010745. Indeed, Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that Janus is an example not so much 
of a pro-business ruling, but one of several in which the Supreme Court has evinced distrust of district courts. 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 375, 389 n.35 (2011); see also A.C. 
Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 135–39 (2011) 
(exploring the Janus opinion in contrast with other securities cases under the Roberts court). 
110.  See, e.g., SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011). 
111.  See Langevoort, supra note 109, at 1 (discussing the formalistic application of the Janus “ultimate 
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In addition, the formalism for which corporate law may be well noted is often 
permitted in circumstances quite unlike the facts of Janus. The typical formalism found 
in corporate law appears, for instance, when it is statutorily authorized (as in the de facto 
merger doctrine not applicable to the Janus facts) or restricted when fraud is involved (as 
in veil piercing and in Janus),
112
 so the Court’s recent embrace of formalism does not fit 
well within the existing corporate canon. 
IV. THE COURT’S THEORY OF THE FUND
Beyond the specific contours of the Janus ruling, the decision in Jones v. Harris 
sheds additional light upon the assumptions regarding the theoretical operations of 
investment funds that the Supreme Court appears to be making in this body of 
jurisprudence. In several instances at oral arguments and in their written opinions, the 
justices appear to assume that mutual funds operate within the same structure of 
competitive forces as conventional business firms. In doing so, they do not consider that 
the efficient operation of those firms is premised in theory upon several dynamics that are 
inapplicable to investment funds. 
For instance, one of the arguments advanced by contractual theories of the firm in 
opposition to their managerial counterparts is that managerial power is checked in a firm 
by multiple independent layers of competing market forces: the markets for corporate 
control, for labor, and for products.113 Those forces are notably absent in investment 
funds. Investment funds also require shareholders to monitor both the underlying 
portfolio investments as well as the behavior of their paid intermediary. In addition, 
unlike typical firm shareholders, many of today’s investors in funds have not become 
investors voluntarily, but instead have experienced an involuntary conversion as a result 
of the elimination of their defined benefit plan. 
A. Problems with the Court’s Theory of the Fund 
The Supreme Court appears to be applying a conventional account of effective 
corporate governance in non-fund entities—such as regular C corporations—to the highly 
distinct milieu of investment funds. That standard account usually identifies and approves 
of the interlocking effects of a variety of self-supporting dynamics.114 More specifically, 
the discipline of short selling, incentive stock options, sophisticated shareholders, 
efficient capital markets, and a market for corporate control, among other forces, are 
thought to provide a positive reduction of agency costs upon corporate managers by 
forcing them to maximize returns to their shareholders.115 What the Supreme Court does 
not appear to consider thoughtfully, however, is the idea that such phenomena are largely 
absent in the setting of investment funds and therefore the relevance of such a theoretical 
authority” test).  
112.  Note, also, that although the formality of the corporate form is often upheld against petitions for veil 
piercing, a common justification for that formalism is that other regimes—such as mandatory insurance—exist 
to protect victims. No such regime exists under the facts of Janus. 
113.  Langevoort, supra note 26, at 1030–32, 1037. 
 114.  See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 50 
(2008) (evaluating different corporate governance mechanisms). 
115.  See id. 
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framework is substantially reduced. 
In a particularly trenchant observation, Donald Langevoort has noted that several of 
the most powerful of these devices are absent or impotent in the idiosyncratic 
arrangement of investment funds: 
Because mutual funds are not traded in an organized market, arbitrage 
opportunities cannot work to keep prices in line with rational expectations. 
Mutual fund prices are simply the product of net asset value at the time of 
purchase or redemption. Insider compensation is largely based on assets as 
well, which creates the conflict rather than aligns insider–shareholder interests, 
and directors are typically paid all or mostly in cash. Institutional shareholder 
voice does not exist in the fund area, and there is no external market for 
corporate control at all because shareholders can only sell their shares back to 
the fund.116 
Langevoort thus arrives at the conclusion that any judicial attempts to rely 
unthinkingly upon generic theories of corporate governance when considering the wholly 
different nature of investment funds are highly problematic. “Thinking about mutual 
funds by imagining them simply as a species of ‘corporations’ in a way that is directly 
informed by contemporary corporate law theory is completely misguided,” he argues.117 
Inasmuch as so many of the conventional menu of governance protections are 
missing, the only device that does remain to provide any sort of assistance to the 
governance of investment funds is the possibility of shareholder redemption.118 Again, 
the standard corporate governance account posits that fund sponsors will be reined in 
from governing their investment funds poorly (by extracting rents from their 
shareholders, for example) because fund shareholders will punish such poor management 
by exiting the fund through redemption of their shares or choosing not to invest in such 
funds in the first place. This analysis, however, does not sufficiently countenance the fact 
that investor exit is not just one of the only protections in mutual funds, but that in mutual 
funds this protection is unusually weak and thus does not work as well as it might in the 
usual setting for operating companies. 
In a typical corporation (not an investment fund), sophisticated investors provide all 
manner of ancillary, fall-out benefits to less sophisticated investors. Only wealthy and 
powerful shareholders, for instance, have the capacity to launch proxy contests or other 
competitions for corporate control, to engage in share price arbitrage via short-selling or 
other financial strategies, or to launch expensive and time-consuming tender offers. 
These tactics will benefit not only the shareholder who engages in them but also the 
smaller, passive investors who also happen to hold those shares. With respect to the 
116.  Langevoort, supra note 26, at 1031–32. 
117.  Id. 
 118.  The array of effective mechanisms that Jonathan Macey catalogs also includes initial public offerings 
as a governance measure. See MACEY, supra note 114, at 127–29 (explaining the functionality and value of 
initial public offerings). In the corporate context, IPOs may indeed involve “rigorous monitoring by a cadre of 
lawyers, investment bankers, and financial analysts, all of whom face reputational and legal risks for failure to 
do an adequate job of protecting investors.” Id. at 127. In mutual funds, however, the public offering process is 
very different, as it is overseen primarily by the adviser and its affiliated distributor and is not shepherded by 
investment banks. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 195. Nor are the funds rated by financial analysts in the 
same manner as equity offerings. 
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possibility of simply selling the investment to exit the company, however, the actions of a 
sophisticated investor do not necessarily benefit the passivity of an unsophisticated 
investor, unless a corporation is represented by a mixture of both sorts of investors 
amongst its shareholders.119 If, indeed, the corporation in question does have a 
shareholder base comprising both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, then the 
corporation’s managers must always attempt to manage the enterprise in a way that will 
benefit the most difficult to please. If such a dynamic were true in investment funds, for 
instance, the fund sponsors would be obliged to run their funds in such a way as to keep 
their largest institutional investors happy and invested in the fund, which would provide 
benefits simultaneously to smaller and weaker investors.120 
Yet studies repeatedly show that in the investment fund industry, fund sponsors 
work hard to segregate sophisticated and unsophisticated investors from one another such 
that funds rarely have a heterogeneous mix of the two. Instead, fund sponsors provide 
different investment products for those different kinds of investors and then separate 
them from one another.121 Typically, the sophisticated investors demand and receive 
distinct funds, which may be managed according to similar investment protocols but 
come with far lower prices and other terms.122 For less sophisticated investors in their 
own funds, the only way that exit will work as an effective corporate governance device 
is if those less sophisticated investors take action directly on their own behalf,123 in 
reliance upon the fund sponsor’s own disclosure. Yet evidence shows that less wealthy 
and less sophisticated investors simply do not possess the ability to digest that disclosure 
or to act upon it in an effective manner. 
B. The Problems with Exit in Investment Funds 
As so many of the Supreme Court’s assumed elements of corporate governance 
theory are inapposite to investment funds, shareholder exit remains as the only possibly 
viable one. When one considers how exit might—or might not—work in the context of 
funds, one must begin to consider the theoretical elements that are similar regarding 
corporate governance and markets for products.124 
Investors in mutual funds are more technically described as shareholders, which of 
course prompts an inquiry into the precise nature of the standard rights they enjoy as 
equity and residuary owners. Yet, unlike so many other equity shareholders, their sole 
mode of protection from deleterious anticompetitive tendencies in markets is their ability 
 119.  See Birdthistle, supra note 37, at 1455 (discussing market timing); Langevoort, supra note 98, at 1034 
(citing Mahoney, supra note 104, at 168–69) (positing a “suspicion that the market for mutual funds is indeed 
segmented into more and less sophisticated consumer groups, with funds (or even classes within the same fund) 
with different quality attributes appealing to different segments”). 
120.  See Birdthistle, supra note 37, at 1455. 
121.  See id. 
122.  See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 184. 
123.  For a discussion of the weaknesses of informational intermediaries and conflicts of brokers in the 
mutual fund context, see Birdthistle, supra note 37. See also Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst 
Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083, 1097–98 (2007) (discussing the conflicts of interests and questionable 
independence of mutual fund analysts). 
 124.  See Langevoort, supra note 98, at 1036–40 (discussing hypotheses of product market competition 
ideologies). 
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to redeem their fund shares, which raises the broader question of how best to characterize 
such investors. Indeed, in the market for products, potential customers also are protected 
almost solely by their ability and willingness to buy or to sell a product—the fear that 
they will not buy or that they will sell provides some incentive for the producer of such 
products to perform its task well. 
This debate found voice in Jones v. Harris, when several judges at different stages 
in the litigation bypassed the plaintiffs’ status as shareholders and instead reasoned that 
they were primarily the purchasers of products and should, accordingly, enjoy fewer legal 
protections. This curious rationale, however, rapidly eliminates many of the statutory 
provisions that Congress enacted precisely to safeguard the interests of those kinds of 
investors. Certain jurists, of course, might wonder why a mutual fund shareholder ought 
to enjoy greater protections from another market participant who is merely a consumer of 
products. 
Of course, the most direct response is to point out that the structure of investment 
funds is largely the result of Congressional regulation via the Investment Company Act 
of 1940—thus, investors in investment funds are shareholders and not merely consumers 
because Congress has willed it so.125 Thus, unless and until Congress alters its 
legislation, courts are obliged to conduct their theoretical analyses of investment funds 
within the system of corporate governance, even if that model does not apply with 
satisfying relevance when contrasted with more conventional operating companies. 
Certainly, as we have seen, the paradigm of governance in investment funds is 
remarkably weaker than that of conventional corporations, not simply because funds 
enjoy fewer devices that discipline fund managers, but also because the solitary device 
they do enjoy—shareholder exit—works far less well in the context of investment funds. 
When one recalls that much of this past decade has witnessed the once-heralded 
mutual fund suffer from a regular series of investigations by prosecutors and lawsuits by 
investors, one finds a litany of how vulnerable funds find themselves across their array of 
operations: market timing, late trading, unfair valuation, 12b-1 fees, and so forth.126 As 
individuals find themselves beset with increasing responsibility for investing their own 
retirement assets as pensions give way to defined contribution plans throughout the 
public and private economies, there is no evidence that unsophisticated individuals have 
the ability or the willingness to allocate their investments wisely. Studies demonstrate 
repeatedly that large numbers of individuals do not enroll in their retirement plans,127 or 
that if they do, large percentages then fail to allocate those funds to anything beyond the 
standard cash investment.128 And even when investors do enroll and do invest, they 
appear to do so poorly, with little skill at the timing or risk of their investment decisions. 
 125.  See generally Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
180a-64). 
 126.  See generally Birdthistle, supra note 37 (explaining the participants and mechanisms involved in the 
mutual fund investment irregularities). 
 127.  See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or for Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior, 
in PERSPECTIVES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81–121 (David Wise ed., 2004) (noting the low level of 
enrollment found absent automatic enrollment). 
128.  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 27. 
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C. Other Theories of the Fund 
Clearly the Supreme Court could enrich its fund jurisprudence by taking judicial 
notice of the important distinctions between firms and funds. Moreover, if the Court were 
to examine the managerial and neoclassical traditions of firm theory,129 in addition 
merely to its contractual130 predilection, the Court might be able to develop a more 
satisfying intellectual conception of the investment fund.131 
Not only would developing a better theory of the fund assist in the future resolution 
of litigation—which is surely destined to arrive as more public governments and state 
legislatures eliminate their pension plans in response to budgetary constraints—but it 
might also prove a useful tool for legislatures themselves, who may wish to address the 
subject either because of the broader economic growth of funds or because decisions such 
as Jones and Janus have explicitly punted the resolution of such issues back to 
lawmakers.132 
V. CONCLUSION 
After a hiatus of almost a quarter-century, the Supreme Court has again considered 
the legal issues affecting investment funds, home to more than $12 trillion in U.S. 
savings. In two important rulings—Jones and Janus—in two consecutive Terms, the 
Court has misapplied conventional, neoclassical133 conceptions of the firm to the 
operations of funds. In so doing, the Court has produced unsatisfying and highly 
formalistic opinions that bear little resemblance to the functional realities of fund 
operations. Indeed, in Janus, Justice Thomas acknowledged the formalistic shortcomings 
of his ruling but simply identified Congress as the ultimate authority for ameliorating any 
unfortunate consequences of the ruling.134 Of course, as with any formalistic ruling that 
draws bright lines, the Janus ruling brings the possibility of great mischief if operating 
companies ever choose to emulate the structure of investment funds simply to enjoy 
similar immunities from Rule 10b-5 litigation. The Supreme Court must attempt to 
 129.  See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1 (2002) (providing an overview of these traditions). 
 130.  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (discussing the contractual theory of the firm). 
 131.  See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 1593, 1685 (1988). 
132.  MACEY, supra note 114.  
 133.  FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 
(1991). 
134.  See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011). 
Although First Derivative and its amici persuasively argue that investment advisers exercise 
significant influence over their client funds . . . it is undisputed that the corporate formalities were 
observed here. JCM and Janus Investment Fund remain legally separate entities, and Janus 
Investment Fund's board of trustees was more independent than the statute requires. 15 U.S.C. § 
80a-10[fn9]. Any reapportionment of liability in the securities industry in light of the close 
relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is properly the responsibility of 
Congress and not the courts. 
Id.  
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develop a far richer, more nuanced theory of how funds operate and theoretical paradigm 
for their future governance. All signs suggest that massive new flows of retirement 
savings and former pension funds will soon be flowing into investment funds, which is 
sure to increase the flow of fund litigation throughout the federal courts. We must build a 
strong and sound intellectual foundation for these structures before that flow arrives and 
pours stress upon our defenses, not afterwards when the damage has already occurred. 
